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to the publication." (George on Libel, 340-41.) 'And proof of
special damage, in ordinary cases, relieves entirely from the necessity of showing malice.
This is, perhaps, all that need be said of particular actions. Into
many others malice enters as an aggravating circumstance, though
not essential to their maintenance. It is an undeniable general
principle that an act legal in itself, and which violates no right,
cannot be made actionable on account of the motive by which it is
prompted. Chatfield vs. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49. As has already
been remarked, there is an increasing tendency in modern adjudication to dissociate legal proceedings from any consideration of mental conditions. The old terms and phrases will, doubtless, be
retained; yet, like many others in language at large, they will be
formal and meaningless. This tendency is in harmony with the
healthy progressiveness of the age. The allowance to any man or
set of men of the right to judge by what internal purpose; action is
in a given case, controlled, places in their hands a dangerous engine
of power, which can only be restrained by inflexible rules of evidence. The doctrine was originally unnecessary; with a few
exceptions, it belongs to the past.
G. S. L. S.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

Ia the United States Court-outh CyarolinaDistrict-In
Admiralty.
JAMES MARSH & SON vs. THE BRIG MINNIE.
JOHN COMMINS VS. THE BRIG MINNIE.
BEE & TYLEE VS. THE BRIG MINNIE.
HENRY SMYZER VS. THE BRIG MINNIE.

1. By the maritime law there is no lien for supplies in the home port.
is supposed to be given to the owner, and not the ship.

The credit

2. J. C. owned the brig M. and sold to T., who secured the purchase money by a
mortgage duly executed and recorded. Subsequent to the sale and excution of the
mnsrtgage, J. M. & Son repaired the brig and kept her in their custody until the
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marshal attached her; B. & T. furnished ship chandlery, but were at no time in
possession; II. S. did the joiner work, but was at no time in possession: Held,
that these liens must be marshaled, as fellows-First, J. NT.&Son, the shipwrights,
must be paid, because they had a strict maritime lien, and had possession, and
no act of the owner can defeat a lien which the law creates; second, the mortgagee,
and third, the balance ratably to the other libelants.
3. The mortgage act of 1850 considered and interpreted.
4. Where the vessel is in her home port, and the material men are notin possession,
and no local law recognizes their claims as privileged, they must be postponed to
the mortgage creditor who has an interest in rem.

Wim. D. Porter, Esq., for James Marsh & Son.
Edw'd H10'readcy, -Esq., for Bee & Tylee, and Henry Smyzer.
-. P. O'Conner, .Esq., for John Commins.
J.:--In these cases libels have been filed to recover
certain sums of money, and for which, it is contended in each case,
that there is a lien.
John Commins, being the owner of the brig Minnie, sold her to
W. H. Trott, the purchase being altogether on credit. W. H. Trott
gave his promissory note to John Commins, dated the 19th May,
1856, at sixty days, for 1,400, and to secure its payment, executed a mortgage of the brig, dated the 4th June, 1856. The.
mortgage is duly executed, and recorded in the office of the Collector of Customs for the port of Charleston, where the brig is
registered. The note is still unpaid.
On the 7th June, 1856, James Marsh & Son, who have also
libeled, and are shipwrights, commenced repairing the brig. They
continued to work upon her until the 7th August, 1856, at which
time, having completed their work, they now claim that there is due
for it S2,808 80. Before they commenced, they took the brig into
their possession, and so kept her, until they surrendered her to the
process of this court. They also claim the further sum of $181
for the services of a ship-keeper.
Bee & Tylee, ship chandlers, have also libeled the brig for
$1,994 38, the value of materials and supplies furnished by them.
They have not been in possession.
Henry Smyzer, ship joiner, has also libeled for 8372, the value
of work done by him. He has not been in possession.
MAGRATH,
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The lien claimed by James Marsh & Son, is derived from the
possession, which, as shipwrights, they had. The lien claimed by
John Commins is derived from his mortgage. The lien claimed by
Bee & Tylee and Henry Smyzer, is derived from the allegation that
the brig was owned out of the limits of this State. Had such proof
been made as satisfied me that this allegation was supported, it
would have led me to decree the payment of these claims, in an
order different from that which I will now direct. In such a case,
liens under the rule of the maritime law, would have been implied (in
the absence of the owner) for the benefit of all material men. But
this has not been proved. W. H. Trott may be a citizen of New
York and not resident within the limits of this State; but if so, it
admits of higher and stronger proof than has been made, and which
consists of idle discourse in which he indulged. If his declarations
concerning his residence in New York are entitled to weight, as
proof of that fact, then would his declarations as to his residence
in Charleston, be also entitled to weight. In the mortgage to Cornmins he declares himself a citizen of Charleston, and he must
have sworn to the same statement. I cannot, then, under such circumstances, declare him to be a citizen of New York, or resident of
any other place than Charleston, particularly when the consequences
to him might be so very serious.
Had the non-residence here of W. H. Trott been proved, it would
not have availed the parties who, from it, if proved, supposed that
a lien would arise in their favor. . For he is here, and has been here,
and might have been sued. And when the owner is present, the
reason for the maritime lien ceases, and the contract is inferred to
be with him, on his ordinary personal responsibility, without a view
to the vessel itself as security. St. Jago de Cuba, 9 Wheat. R.
409, Fland. Mar. Law, 186. The brig is then before me, as in her
home, port, where her owner resides, and upon this I will now proceed to determine the relative positions of the lien claimed against
her.
A lien arising under the maritime law is neither derived from, nor
governed by the same principle as relates to a lien at common law.
By the common law "a lien is the right in the possessor of pro-
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perty to hold it for the satisfaction of some demand." (Montagu
on Lien.) The right to retain the possession, and the fact that it is
retained, are essential to a lien in every case. Lickbarrow vs. Mason, 9 East, 27.
But, in the maritime law, possession is not material in a question
of lien. By that law, the benefit of the lien may be preserved,
consistently with the enjoyment by the debtor of the right of ownership, including in this, the possession and control of the vessel.
In countries -which admit the rule of the civil law, which is also
the rule in the admiralty, repairs and necessaries form a lien upon
the ship. Such was the law in England, until reversed by the
House of Lords in the time of Charles I.
The Zodiac, 1
Hagg, 325.
It is, perhaps, too late for us to inquire with what reason the
rule of the maritime law, which followed that of the civil law, in
regard to liens, was modified in England. A sense of natural justice is satisfied in declaring, that he who expends labor for the
benefit of another shall be entitled to look to the thing benefited
by such labor, as the primary source of such payment. No equivalent is afforded for the denial of this, in remitting the creditor as
in the case of a material man to his personal action against the
owner. A remedy operating wholly in personam is very seldom an
efficient substitute for a proceeding in rem.
But if it is no longer of use to examine the reasons for which, in
former days, essential modifications and, in some cases, positive
prohibitions were adopted in relation to the admiralty, there is still
great use in understanding how a spirit of rivalry, permitted to
interfere, falsified the great issue of determining a question between
courts of auxiliary and, in some cases, of concurrent jurisdiction,
by reference to the public good, and made every thing subordinate
to a desire for success.
Without the jealousy, and with little, if any, of the acrimony
which marked the discussion in England; but nevertheless with
great interest and ability, has the question been discussed in the
United States, of the meaning in the constitution of the United
States, of "all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." De
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Lovis vs. Boit, 2 Gallison, 398; llamsay vs. The Allegro, 12
Wheat., 611; Bains vs. The Schooner James and Catharine, 1
Baldwin, 545; The Huntress, Daveis, 82. And without introducing here anything not pertinent to the case before me, I
may very well observe, that the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States is not determined by the narrow construction which in England served to define it; but embraces a
larger number of cases, recognized as properly within its spirit and
jurisdiction.
'When in the time of Charles I., it was resolved, that the
jurisdiction of the admiralty did not extend to cases in rem where
the common law courts would afford a remedy in personam, the
lien, which until then belonged to the material man, was lost.
In all cases, therefore, where the ship was in her home port, or
the person of the owner could be served, the lien of the material
man was divested, and the remedy was by action against the owner.
With foreign ships the lien was preserved, but from necessity; and
it is only with such vessels that the material man enjoyed that
security which once applied to all vessels.
But in England, and in many of the United States, the wisdom
of the maritime law as formerly enforced, has been vindicated by
recent legislation. New York, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Illinois,
Indiana, Massachusetts, Maine, Connecticut, and perhaps others,
have provided, that on all vessels, whether foreign or domestic, in
the home port, or abroad, material men shall have the benefit of a
lien to the extent of work done or supplies furnished. In South
Carolina there has not been any corresponding legislation ; and
the general rule applicable is that laid down in the GeneralSmith,
4 Wheat., 438. To this rule in England, and in the United
States, there has been always an exception in favor of the shipwright who may be in possession. Abbott, 178; 3 Kent, 169;
The Vibilia, 1 W. Rob. 7. For him a lien arises from the common
law. Fland. Mar. Law, 186, 4 B. & Ald. 341. And the contract
for repairs being a maritime contract, the lien may be enforced in
the admiralty. Peyrouz vs. Howard, 7 Pet. 340.
The lien claimed by James Marsh & Son, is of this kind, and
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corresponds to the lien which they would have under the general
maritime law. But its value when enforced in this court, depends
on the solution of another question ; and that is, whether it will be
here considered, as it would be in a court of law; or whether it
will be here treated as a maritime lien in the proper sense of that
term. And this question involves an important issue, as between
James Marsh & Son and John Commins. If they have but the
naked lien of the common law, they must be postponed to John
Commins; but if, as material men in possession, they have t lien
which can be enforced in the admiralty; and it is enforced here,
as a maritime lien, then they will be preferred.
At the common law, a lien implies a power to hold: nothing
more. He who has a lien, may hold; but except in certain cases,
which need not be here considered, he cannot sell. The sale of the
property to satisfy the lien can only be accomplished through an
execution, following the judgment in a personal action against the
owner. He who holds a lien, detains the thing which it affects,
until he gets his judgment; and then sues out his execution under
which he sells. In the admiralty, as has been already said, possession is not essential to the lien. Te Marion, 1 Story R. 73.
The lien is in rem; not only against the thing, but in the thing.
Adhering to it, from its equitable properties; following it, into the
hands of third persons; and never divested, but by payment;
destruction of the thing; or consent of parties. Although wide in
its operation, and liberal in its spirit, it can never do injustice. It
is closely watched; and is ever defeated by that evidence which
would be sufficient to establish the conclusion of personal credit to
the owner. It cannot be used for fraud; because it cannot be kept
secret, by being delayed; for it would be unsafe in him who claims
it, to allow it to remain not enforced longer than the end of the
voyage then in progress. The Carter,4 Cranch, 332; The Boston, 1 How. & B1. 327.
In the admiralty when a lien arising from some other source than
the maritime law is enforced, it will be, according to the rule of the
maritime law, and to the same extent, with a general maritime lien
of that class, unless its operation is otherwise limited. If there is
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no limitation or qualification of the lien, by the law creating it,
then this court will not undertake to affix to it, limitation or qualification. As it comes without either, so will it be enforced.
1 Story, 173. A material man, who acquires a lien, either by the
common law or statute, under a maritime contract, and enforces it
in this court, must enforce it in the same manner as a pure maritime
lien, unless made subject to some qualification under the law which
creates it. Davis vs. A New Brig, Gilpin, 473; Fland. M. Law,
187. These general principles must now be applied in deciding to
what rank shall this lien of James Marsh & Sons be assigned in the
distribution of the proceeds of this vessel. Is it preferred-held to
be equal-or postponed to the mortgage held by John Commins,
and which is prior in date to this lien ?
I have established it, when adopted in this court, as a maritime
lien. It is enforced here, because it is connected with a maritime
contract, and is in consistency with the principles of the general
maritime law, which give a lien in all such cases. And the admiralty court, when it enforces this lien, must do so upon the same
principles that it applies to the lien under the general maritime law,
and to the same end; which is to have a preference for a debt
which it holds as privileged. Boone vs. ML7e Rornet, Crabbe, 432.
The sale is the mode in which this court gives value to the lien, and
secures the preference. By it the lien, whether operating as a
power to hold, or in any other manner, becomes converted into
money, out of which creditors may be paid. The contract out of
which it arises is, as I have said, a maritime contract; and to such
a contract the maritime law gives a lien. That lien is not allowed
here, in the home port of the vessel, to exist; but another lien, by
another code of laws, may arise: and such a lien this court is competent to enforce, but only because, growing out of a maritime contract, it is here still regarded as a maritime lien. There is no rule
concerning its enforcement, in the local law out of which it arises.
This court, then, has to consider it as it would its own lien, in a
similar case, if it-were operative. And the priority which it would
give to that lien, it will give to this.
The mortgage held by John Commins is not a maritime hypothe-
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cation, and cannot, as an original proceeding, be maintained in this
court. Bogart vs. John Jay, 17 How. 399. In the maritime law it
is not compared with those contracts which furnish the means by
which a vessel is aided on her voyage. Ships, in the quaint language
of the law, were made to plough the seas, and not to rot in the
docks. And the contracts which are instrumental in aiding them
to accomplish their mission, are preferred, to such as detain them.
A mortgage, when compared with a bottomry, is called a dry
security; it imparts no vigor to the thing to which it is attached.
Much has been said of the notice which James Marsh & Son had
of the mortgage, when they were doing this work. I do not think
that a question of notice has any place in a discussion involving
the operation and effect of maritime liens. They do not arise by
agreement-are not created by the act of parties-but are in themselves legal consequences. No one can, by his act, prevent a creditor, having a lien on his property, from enforcing it. But he is
equally disqualified from defeating a lien which the law creates. If
James Marsh & Son were not in possession, no person could give
them a preference over the mortgagee. If the general maritime
rule prevailed here, (and I have decided that it is considered as
prevailing here, Pro 1hae vice, through this lien of these material
men,) no act of an owner, whether prior or posterior in time, could
give any one a preference over the material man. Their contract
is with the vessel itself, not with the owner; and to it a fixed place
is allotted in the maritime law, which no one can disturb.
Nor is there in this rule any hardship which may, at the first
view, appear as any objection. Let it not be said that by it the
owner can at any time extinguish the mortgage by a contract for
repairs, which create a lien prior to the mortgagee. If an owner
should attempt to make a contract for which a lien arises, and which
in its operation supercedes the claim of the mortgagee, that mortgagee, if he -were entitled to it, would have a right in equity to
enjoin the progress of the work, until such measures might be
adopted as would stay the progress of the work. However it may
be in cases which the law cannot reach, yet, in all cases which it
can reach, it enforces the principle that no one shall indirectly do,
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that which he cannot do directly. A mortgagee cannot waste or
destroy that which he has made the subject of security to another.
Before leaving this part of the case, I must add, that I cannot
consider the equity of the mortgagor comparable with that of the
shipwright. This is not the vessel which the mortgagee took as
security for a debt. Much work has been done, much labor
expended, much material supplied. If in this case the shipwright
did not have a lien, by virtue of his possession, all would be lost to
him. The mortgagee would have power to sell, and unless the
material man is able to protect himself, by buying or bidding, the
debt of a mortgagee, secured by a hull, may be paid by the bill of
sale of a vessel, repaired and refitted at a heavy expense.
I proceed now to inquire how far the priority claimed by James
Marsh & Son is affected by the Act of Congress passed in the year
1850, and which provides that no bill of sale, mortgage, hypothecation, or conveyance, shall be valid against any other person than
the grantor or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, and persons
having actual notice thereof; unless such bill of sale, mortgage,
hypothecation, or conveyance, be recorded in the office of the collector of customs where such vessel is registered and enrolled.
And to this is added the proviso, "that the lien by bottomry, on
any vessel created during her voyage, by a loan of money or materials necessary to repair, or enable such vessel to prosecute a voyage,
shall not lose its priority, or be in any way affected by the provisions of this act."
If the act of 1850 had been passed to marshal the liens which
arise under the maritime law, or to classify maritime contracts,
then it might be that the omission of a certain claim, in the enumeration of such as shall constitute a prior class, would be equivalent to its postponement. But that which Congress intended to
regulate was of a very different kind. The rights and liabilities of
a mortgagee of a vessel had been a matter of doubt and controversy, often submitted to courts, and not unfrequently resulting in
contrary decisions. To prevent this, and settle all doubt, by not
allowing any interest to affect third persons, of which they did not
have actual notice, Congress declared that no transfers of a vessel,
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absolute or qualified, should be valid, except as against the grantor
or mortgagor, his heirs and devisees, unless recorded. The only
possible ground for the opinion that this question is affected by the
act of 1850, is from the use of the general term, "hypothecation."
But it is quite clear that "hypothecation," as used in the act, must
refer to that class of hypothecations which are proved by some
instrument in writing, and are created by the act of the parties.
In the maritime law, all maritime contracts imply hypothecation;
but the cases in which these hypothecations arise are clearly such
as never could be in the contemplation of those who framed that
act, as proper to be recorded, or that it should be essential to their
validity. It is well that he who has a lien created by the act of
parties, should not hold it so that it may be injurious to others.
If the law does not require the transfer of a vessel to be recorded,
it is as good without the record as with it. No wider field could be
opened for fraud, than the privilege of having liens, and keeping
them secret and concealed. This mischief is met by the act of
1850. And its operation would seem to include every case, where
a transfer, absolute or qualified, is made in writing, and therefore
capable of being recorded.
The general rule being thus laid down, a bottomry bond must be
specially excepted; for that is an hypothecation created by the act
of parties, and exists in writing. It would thus, unless excepted,
be governed by the act, for there is no test of priority under the
act, except that arising from recording. Whatever transfer is first
recorded, passed the interest, absolute or qualified, which it professes to convey. But nothing could be more unjust than the
operation of that rule in relation to a bQttomry bond. Such hypothecations arise abroad: the act of the master in a.foreign port,
where he can have, or is supposed to have, no other resource, with
which to prosecute his voyage or repair his vessel. To be foreign
has been considered so essential a characteristic, that it has been
doubted whether the owner in her home port can make a valid
hypothecation in a security of this kind. The St. Jago de Cuba,
9 Wheat. 416. If a stranger, far away, makes with the masier a
bottomry contract, by which the vessel is floated and speeded on
22
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her course, shall such a contract be postponed to some other, made
by the owner, and for which priority is claimed, because it is
recorded? Such would be the consequence, if bottomry bonds were
not excepted. To obviate this difficulty, the exception is made in
the manner already stated. But a bottomry bond is simply excepted,
it is not preferred by the act ; it is left where it would be, if the act
had not been passed. If the bottomry holder had a priority before
the act, he will still have it. But he did have a priority given by
the maritime law: to it, then, we must refer for the nature and
extent of that priority. Whatever is the relation which a bottomry
contract bears to other maritime contracts, according to the maritime law, determines the relation which such maritime contracts
would bear to those mentioned in the act of 1850. If such maritime contracts are preferred by the maritime law to a bottomry contract, and a bottomry contract is entitled to a priority over the
contracts mentioned in the act of 1850, of course the preference of
such maritime contracts as those mentioned in the act of 1850 is at
once necessary and clear.
There is 'nomode of considering maritime hypothecations in which
the impossibility of regarding them as necessarily to be. recorded,
does not become apparent. I have said that they often arise from
circumstances, often suddenly developed; and their nature and
extent, in most cases, is not known until they are perfected, and
capable of being enforced. The extent of repairs is generally
uncertain, and the amount, of the debt continues uncertain until
the Work is done. The wages of a seaman can never be calculated
until the voyage is ended. The claim of a freighter for damage
does not arise until, the damage being done, the vessel arrives in
port. If a ship from New York, being damaged, is in this port
refitted and repaired, can a mortgagee from that city take her out
of the hands of the shipwright? Can he extinguish a claim for
damage under affreightment, by exhibiting his mortgage? Can he
deprive a seaman of wages, because the contract for his services
has not been recorded ? No one will affirm either of these as results
whi6h the law would accomplish; yet they are, if the act is not read
with the qualifications I have suggested.
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But the public mischief which would arise from any other construction of the act, than that which I have suggested, would be
deplorable. The rule under which maritime hypothecations are
protected, is peculiar to no clime, bounded byno territory, confined
to no locality. They operate as security for the material man, and
as security for the owner of the ship. To the one, it gives the vessel as security for the work he may do; to the other, it offers the
assurance that, if disaster shall befall his vessel, she will be refitted
and depatched on her voyage. It is a common covenant, to which
the commercial nations of the world are parties, and in which each
secures for its citizens or subjects, indemnity and succor. Its cardinal principle, therefore, is that a maritime contract implies hypothecation: work done and supplies furnished create a special security in the vessel. No evidence is required of the assent of the
owner: the maritime law implies it from the necessity, and supplies
it. It gives it for him, and makes the security prior to others. In
the strong language of Judge Johnson, "the vessel must get on:
this is the consideration that controls every other." "The whole
object of giving admiralty process and priority of payment to privileged creditors, is to furnish wings and legs to the forfeited hull to
get back, for the benefit of all concerned." 9 Wheat. 416. If
this contract is broken or disturbed, so that the security implied in
a maritime contract is denied or made doubtful, and the lien of the
foreign mechanic or merchant is made subordinate to contracts in
the home port, a blow will be struck at commerce productive of the
most ruinous consequences. The lien of James Marsh & Son I
hold, therefore, prior to that claimed by the mortgagee.
I come now to the consideration of the claim of the mortgagee.
Freed from the questions which have been considered, he would
have a right to a sale of the vessel in default of payment, and the
surplus would belong to the mortgagor. But his right to any priority is contested; and it is a matter of importance to him, as it is
supposed that the vessel will not be sold for as much as is necessary
to discharge all the claims made against her.
After seamen's wages, which are favored in admiralty and held
sacred as long as a plank of the ship remains, the claims of material
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men receive the consideration of the court. But in this case, as this
is the home port of the vessel, these material men have no lien.
They are not in possession, the vessel is in her home port, and no
local law recognizes their claim as privileged. They are in this
court because they are parties to a maritime contract, which entitles
them to pursue their remedy in personam, although they have no
lien; and "they may intervene in the distribution of the surplus after
liens are satisfied. On the other hand, the mortgagee has no maritime contract for which he can seek a remedy here; yet he has an
interest in the thing itself. The question is between two kinds of
creditors, the one never having had a lien, and the other having
had, at one time, a lien, which has been diverted in consequence of
the extinguishment of the thing in specie, by the action of the court
in its order for a sale.
The right which the mortgagee had he cannot enforce, because
the court has assumed jurisdiction of the subject matter; and being
competent to do so, no other court would interfere. Had the mortgagee seized the vessel, it would not have ousted the court of its
jurisdiction. And a sale if made by him, would not affect a subsisting maritime lien, not waived or lost from want of diligence.
Filing a bill for foreclosure would have involved the question how
far it was a proceeding in rem, to determine whether the material
man were by it deprived of the rights which are recognized in this
court. Wall vs. Mhe Royal Saxon, 2 Am. Law Register, 324.
It must not, however, be understood from this, that the mortgagee
is affected in his proper rights in the security which he holds. It
is not because in the admiralty a lien paramount to his mortgage is
enforced, which lien could not be adjudicated in a court of law or
equity, that his rights are thereby diminished. His rights are determined not only according to principles administered in a court
of law or equity; but are also held by him subordinate, to such
also as are enforced in a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The proper measure of any right is determined by the combined operation and effect of all laws which are of force in relation
to it.
It would, therefore, be extremely incorrect to say, that had the
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mortgagee sued in this, or that court, or pursued this or that course
of conduct, that his rights would be properly any other, than such
as they will be under the decree of this court, or of any other court
of competent jurisdiction. It would argue but little for the excellence of our system of jurisprudence, if it depended on the court to
which a party appealed, to determine whether he would obtain the
-whole or the half of that which he claimed. Such a rule would
measure the rights of parties by the pleasure of the suitor, for having choice of the forum, he would seek that most favorable to him.
If the mortgagee here had prosecuted his claim in another forum,
to which it would appear, that under another code of laws, not
administered by it, there were other rights in the same subject
xiatter; it would be the duty, as it has been always the custom of
judicial tribunals in such cases, to allow the question to be decided
in that tribunal where all the rights of all the parties could be considered and adjudged.
I have made these remarks, because in the course of the argument, much was said of what was done, and of what might have
been done. But no court will enforce a right to the prejudice of
some other right, which can only be enforced in another court. If
in a court of law, its proceedings are likely to be perverted by
suitors to purposes of wrong, a court of equity is open to afford
relief. When the judgment of a court has been pronounced, with
all parties before it, and the court has competent jurisdiction, it is
presumed to be right. But if parties have been excluded, or could
not be heard; or a question has been passed over; or could not be
decided; and in consequence of this, injustice has been done; then
I should be slow to doubt, what so far from doubting I affirm, that
there is always a mode open and available by which error may be
corrected, omissions supplied, and right and justice administered in
the most complete manner.
It is not then, because the mortgagee has been stopped, that this
indicates more than the authority of a court has been substituted
for that of an individual. His rights are still to be determined.
He has now no claim in rem ; but the proceeds of the sale represent the vessel. His claim is postponed to the shipwrights', because
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they had a lien which I have sustained as a maritime lien, and prior.
But the other material men have no lien; and therefore no remedy
in rem. Of course, they cannot have an equity against the proceeds of sale, except as against the owner. Their admission here
to be paid from the surplus, is a doctrine at first slowly received;
and concerning the true source of which there is not even now the
certainty that we might expect and desire. Their claim upon the
surplus is worked out through the debtor; and their equity as
against him, in the proceeds of a sale, is admitted. But that cannot
be compared with the claim of a mortgagee, which existed as a lien
affecting the vessel itself, was divested by the action of the court,
and p6stponed to another lien; but which by the plainest principles
of equity survives against the proceeds, or the surplus which remains, to the exclusion of all others who are but general creditors.
I have no hesitation in holding, that after the payment to James
Marsh & Son, John Commins is entitled to be paid the amount due
him under his mortgage. The balance then remaining will be
divided ratably between Bee & Tylee and Henry Smyzer. The
decree will be so entered.
In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1858.
EUGENE SULLIVAN VS. THE PHILADELPHIA AND READING RAILROAD.

1. The carrier's contract withhispassengerimplies : first, that the latter shall obey
the former's reasonable regulations ; second, that the carrier shall have his means
of transportation complete and in order, and his servants competent.
2. If a passenger be hurt without his own fault, this fact raises a presuimption of
negligence, and casts the onus on the carrier.
8: This being a presumption of fact, it is for the jury to determine.
4. Erie Railroad vs. Skinner, 7 Harr. 298; 1 Am. Law Reg. 97, explained.
5. It is no answer to an"action by a passenger against the carrier, that the injury
was caused by the negligence, or even trespass, of a third person. The parties
are bound by their contract.

This case came up on a writ of error to the Common Pleas of
Chester county.
The opinion of the court, in which the facts appear, was delivered by
WOODWARD, J.-When a railroad company undertakes the trans-
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portation of a passenger for an agreed price, the contract includes
many things. On the part of the passenger, his consent is implied
to all the company's reasonable rules and regulations, for entering,
occupying and leaving their cars; and if injury befall him by reason
of his disregard of regulations which are necessary to the conduct
of the business, the company are not liable in damages, even though
the negligence of their servants concurred with his own negligence
in causing the mischief.
On the part of the company, the contract implies that they are
provided with a safe and sufficient railroad to the point indicated ;
that their cars are staunch, and roadworthy; that means have been
taken beforehand to guard against every apparent danger that may
beset the passenger; and that the servants in charge are tried,
sober, competent men. When, in performing this contract, they
hurt a passenger without fault of his, the law raises prima facie a
presumption of negligence, and throws on the company the onus of
showing it did not exist. This may be shown, and the legal presumption repelled, by proving that the injury resulted from inevitable accident, or, as it is commonly called, the act of God, or that
it was caused by something against which no human foresight and
prudence could provide. What these can do for the safety of the
passenger, the law requires the transportating company to do.
But as presumptions of law are always for the court to pronounce,
so are the repelling circumstances relied on, for the jury. The legal
presumption, which is only an inference from general experience,
remains of force until a countervailing presumption of facts is established; and as this is a conclusion drawn from particular circumstances, it is for the jury to consider these circumstances, and
to determine what is the reasonable deduction.
Yet the court below not only failed to presume negligence from
the fact of the injury, but instructed the jury that if they believed
the testimony in the cause, there was no negligence on the part of
the defendant or its agents.
Again, even more pointedly, the learned judge said, "no proof of
negligence has been exhibited against the agents and engineer,
which would authorize me to submit it to the consideration of the
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jury." This was withdrawing from the jury a case that ought to
have been submitted, with very different instructions. The plaintiff
was in no fault; he had taken his seat within the car, and in all
respects he had demeaned himself as an orderly passenger. Yet he
was injured by the overthrow of the car in which he was seated.
Here was a breach of the company's contract, and here was what
has several times been said by this court to be evidence of the company's neglect; 8 Barr, 483, 12 Harris, 469. Then, if the court
thought there was evidence which was calculated to repel this prima
facie presumption of negligence, they should have submitted it to
the jury.
Whether that spot in the road was not so commonly infested with
cows as to require a fence or cattle guard of some sort; whether
the speed of the cars was not too great for a curve, exposed at all
times to the incursions of cattle ; whether the engineer discovered
the cow as soon as he might, and used his best endeavors to avert
the collision-in a word, whether the accident was such as no foresight on the part of the company or its servants could have prevented; these were questions, and grave ones, too, that ought to
have been submitted to the jury.
The learned judge, after stating correctly the extreme care and
vigilance which the law exacts of railroad companies, asks if they
are required to provide suitable fences and guards to keep cattle off
the road. In answering his question in the negative, the judge
seems to have misapplied the reasoning of Judge Gibson in Skinner's case, 7 Harris, 298; 1 Am.Law Reg. 97. That was an
action by the owner of a cow killed on a railroad, to recover
her value from the company; and the doctrine laid down was
that the owner was a wrong doer in suffering his cow to wander
on a road engaged in transporting passengers, and was rather
liable for damages than entitled to recover them. The owner
of the cow could not insist that the company should fence their
road for the protection of his stock. It was his business to keep
his cattle within his own bounds. Now, such reasoning between a railway company and a trespasser commends itself to
every man's understanding, because it tends to the security of the
passenger. If farmers cannot make companies pay for injuring
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cattle, but they involve themselves in liability for suffering their
cattle to run at large, passengers are all the more secure from this
kind of obstruction.
But when, notwithstanding this strong motive for keeping cattle
off the road, a cow is found there, and causes an injury to a passenger whom the company have undertaken to carry safely, is it an
answer to the passenger suing for damages that the owner of the
cow had no right to let her run at large? Grant that she was unlawfully at large, and grant the owner is bound to indemnify the
company for the mischief she caused, yet as between the company
and its passenger, liability is to be measured by the terms of their
contract.
Having undertaken to carry safely, and holding themselves out
to the world as able to do so, they are not to suffer cows to endanger the life of the passenger, any more than a defective rail or axle.
Whether they maintain an armed police at cross-roads, as is done
by similar companies in Europe; or fence, or place cattle guards
within the bed of their road, or by other contrivance, exclude this
risk, is for themselves'to consider and determine. We do not say
they are bound to do the one or the other, but if, by some means,
they do not exclude the risk, they are bound to respond in damages when injury accrues.
Perhaps the passenger would have his remedy against the owner of
the cow; it is clear, from Skinner's case, that the company would,
but the passenger has unquestionably a remedy against the company.
If he be injured by reason of defective machinery, nobody would
think of setting up the liability of the mechanic who furnished the
bad work, as a defence for the company against the claim of the
passenger. Yet it would be a defence, exactly analogous to that
which satisfied the court in this case. We do not wish to be understood as laying down a general rule, that all railroad companies are
bound, independently of legislative enactment, to fence their roads
from end to end, but we do insist that they are bound to carry passengers safely, or to compensate them in damages. If a road runs
through a farmer's pasture grounds, where his cattle are wont to be,
possibly as between the company and the farmer, the latter may be
bound to fence, but as between the company and the passenger, the
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company are bound to see that the cattle are fenced out. If cattle
are accustomed to 'wander on unenclosed grounds, through which
the road runs, the company are bound to take notice of this fact,
"and either by fencing in their track, or by enforcing
the owner's
obligation to keep his cattle at home, or by moderating the speed
of the train, or in some other manner, to secure the safety of the
passenger. That is their paramount duty. To enable them to perform it, the law entitles them to a clear track, 7 Harris, 298 ; 12
Harris, 496.
Neither cows nor man, not even the servants of the company
engaged in the company's work, are permitted to obstruct it. And
because their right to a clear track is absolute, their duty to carry
safely is imperative. If they tolerate obstructions, they must avoid
the danger by reduced speed and increased vigilance, or answer for
the consequences.
This doctrine in Skinner's case, designed for the safety of the
passenger, was so applied in this case as to compromise it. Herein
was manifest error. The case must go back to be tried on the
question, whether there was anything in the particular circumstances
of the accident to repel the prima facie presumption of negligence.
It is impossible to regard the accident as inevitable. If cattle
were in the habit of coming upon the road at that place, or if there
was nothing to prevent them, it was a contingency that the company were bound to anticipate and provide against.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.
in the Ohesterfield ('Va.) Circuit Court-October Term, 1857.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD

COMPANY VS.

MARTHA 3.

1

JONES.

1. A Railway Company, in the prosecution of its lawful business, is entitled to the
same protection, and subject to the same responsibilities, as a natural person.
2. The want of skill and caution, in the exercise of its privileges, is the true ground
upon which to base any right to recover damages for an injury done to another
by a railway company while engaged in its lawful business.

' We are indebted to the January number of the Quarterly Law Journal for this
case.-Eds. Am. Law Reg.
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3. The fact that cattle are killed by collision with a railway train, at a point where
the railway track crosses a country road, does not render the company responsible in damages, for it has a right to cross the highway, observing proper care and
caution to avoid accident.
4. And the owner of the cattle cannot recover in such case, without proving want
of skill and caution on the part of the company.
5. *The case is much less favorable to the owner, where cattle are killed, straying
on the track of the company, remote from the point of intersection.
6. The fence law of Virginia does not make it lawful for the cattle of persons in the
neighborhood to be upon the track of a railway, unenclosed by a lawful fence,
but merely deprives the company of any remedy against the owners of cattle
for any damages which may result to the company from their straying on such
unenclosed track.
7. In an action against a railway company for damages for killing cattle, the onus
is on plaintiff to prove negligence and misconduct on the part of the company.
8. It is not sufficient for the plaintiff to show the killing by the company, but it is
incumbent on him to show some act of misconduct on the part of the company, to
make out aprima facie case of injury.

-Roscoe B. Beath and C. C. McRae for the plaintiff in error.
Henry Hudnall for the defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
NAsr, J.-The facts of this case, as disclosed by the record, are
as follows: The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company,
being a company legally incorporated by an act of the General Assembly for the construction of a railroad from Richmond to Petersburg, to carry passengers and freight over the same, by means of
locomotives and cars propelled by steam power, was, on the 8th
day of April, 1856, lawfully engaged in running their train upon
their road, when, at or near the crossing of a public or county road,.
the train ran over a cow belonging to the plaintiff in the court below,
and killed her, to recover the value of which this suit was brought.
It also appears that the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, at the time of building their road, were assessed with heavy
damages for the benefit of the land owners, for keeping up the additional fencing rendered necessary by the construction of their road.
It was also proved, that the cow was found dead upon the track
of the railroad, not more than eight or ten yards from the crossing
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of the public road, with her body mangled, and traces of blood and
hair were seen upon the ground and sills, tending to show that the
killing had occurred at or near the intersection of the two roads.
It was further proved that Mrs. Jones, the owner of the cow, was a
lady living in the neighborhood, but whose lands did not adjoin the
railroad, who, like most of the inhabitants of that part of the country,
was in the habit of turning out her cattle to graze and range upon
the unenclosed lands of the neighborhood. There was no proof
offered, upon either side, to show whether the train was running at
the usual speed or not, or to show any want of care and skill in the
management of the train on the part of the conductor or engineer.
Upon this state of facts, the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff
below, and the court rendered judgment for the value of the cow;
and it is the legality of this verdict and judgment that I am now
called upon to review.
The property destroyed is of small value, but the principles involved are of an interesting character, both to the railroad company
and to the people of this county; and as there are a number of
other suits depending in this court of a like character, I have been
requested to reduce my views of the law applicable to such cases, to
writing. In the first place, I will premise, that while the books and
law journals of the day furnish us with numerous decisions of the
courts of England, and the other States of the Union upon similar
subjects, I am not aware that there has been any decision of the
Court of Appeals of Virginia upon this subject, doubtless owing to
the fact that the amount involved would not authorize such a case
to be carried to that court. The principles of law by which this case
is to be decided, are few, and of a familiar character. The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company are the exclusive owners
of their road, along which their trains are conducted, and are
engaged in a useful? pursuit authorized by law, in carrying freight
and passengers over their road by means of locomotives and cars
propelled by steam power. This is their regular and lawful business,
and in the prosecution of which they are entitled to the same protection, and are subject to the same responsibilities as a natural
person. Every man in society has a right to pursue his own lawful

RAILROAD COMPANY vs. JONES.

business, but if in the prosecution of it he inflicts an injury upon
another by his own negligence or improper conduct, he is responsible therefor. So, on the other hand, if a man is engaged in the
prosecution of his lawful business, and an accident occurs, by which
another is injured, without negligence or misconduct on his part, he
is not responsible for it. These principles result from the very
nature and organization of civil society, and lie at the foundation of
all such questions as we are now considering. Hence it is manifest
that the want of skill and caution in the exercise of their privileges
is the true ground upon which to base any right to recover damages
for an injury done to another by a railroad company while engaged
in their lawful business. But it is said that the business of running
a locomotive upon a railroad is one attended with great and peculiar
danger. This is certainly true, but the principle is in no degree
varied, except that it imposes a greater degree of caution and care
in that mode of transportation and travel, than could be required in
the ordinary and less dangerous modes. The degree of skill and
caution must always be in proportion to the liability to accidents
and danger incident to the business.
But this case presents some other questions which it may be
proper for me to consider. From the testimony in the case it is not
exactly certain whether the cow was killed, being found straying
upon the track of the railroad, at some distance from the crossing
of the public road, or was killed exactly at the point of intersection
of the two roads. I will consider the case in both aspects of the evidence. 1st. Upon the hypothesis that she was overtaken upon the
public road, exactly at the point of intersection of the two roads,
which is putting the case upon the most favorable ground for the
plaintiff. In that case, the cow was passing upon a public highway,
where she had a legal right to travel. And it is equally true that
the railroad company had a legal right to run their locomotives and
cars upon that part of their track which crosses the county road. If
the collision occurred there, does it not present the familiar case of
two individuals, who have a common right to travel on the same
road, and which imposes upon each the duty of so exercising that
right as not to injure the rights of others. The maxim sic utere
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tuo ut alienum won lcedas, here emphatically applies. And here
again the obligation of the railroad company to observe a proper
degree of caution and care, in passing such points upon their road,
becomes manifestly necessary. And in view of the peculiar nature
and mode of traveling by locomotives propelled by steam, I hold it
to be the duty of every railroad company not only to blow their
whistles, but to slacken the speed of their trains upon approaching
and passing all such places; and in the event of a failure to do so,
and the happening of a collision at such a point, I should certainly
hold them responsible for any injury that might occur.
The other view of the case, that the cow was found straying upon
the track of the railroad, remote from the point of intersection certainly makes a case less favorable to the plaintiff than the one which
I have just considered; and if the plaintiff could not recover in the
former, without proof of the want of skill and caution on the part of
the railroad company, she can certainly have no right to recover in
the latter case. It was contended, however, by her counsel in the
argument of the case, that our fence law, which denies to a land
owner the right to recover damages for injuries to his crops and
lands by trespasses of stock, except where his lands are enclosed by
a lawful fence, was enacted with reference to the known habit and
usages of the people of the country in turning out their stock to
graze upon the unenclosed lands of the neighborhood, and was an
implied permission to the owners of stock to do so. I do not consider our fence law as conferring any additional right upon the
owners of stock, but only to limit and restrict the right of the land
owner to recover damages to cases where his lands are enclo'sed by
a lawful fence. This I take to be the extent and scope of its operation. And in the event of a suit by the railroad company against
the owner of stock, by reason of their trespassing upon their road,
and -causing their cars to be thrown from the track, it might be a
good defence to such an action that the road was not enclosed by a
lawful fence. IBut concede that our fence-law gives to the owners
of stock the implied right to turn them out to graze upon the unenclosed lands of the neighborhood, this, at most, is permissive only,
and the owner takes upon himself all the risk of accidents which
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may befall them, as well as a liability for the damage they may do
to lands enclosed by a lawful fence. If cattle thus turned out to
graze at large upon the unenclosed lands of the neighborhood, should
stray upon the track of a railroad, the utmost obligations upon-the
railroad company would be, to use all proper care and caution to
avoid an injury to them. But if by inevitable accident they are
killed, it is the misfortune of the owner, and he must bear the loss.
Another question has arisen in this case, about which I have heard
some diversity of opinion expressed, and that is, upon whom does
the burthen of proof rest, in regard to the question of care and diligence on the part of the company, after the stock owner has eitablished the fact of killing. This question, I think too, may be readily
settled by a reference to the familiar rules of practice in courts of
justice. The plaintiff who goes into court, complaining of injury, is
bound to make at least a prima facie case, and if the previous reasoning of the court is correct, it is incumbent upon him to show
some act of misconduct on the part of the company before he can
even make a prima facie case of any injury. The failure to exercise proper care and diligence lies at the very foundation of the
action, and if he stops short of this proof, he fails to make out even
a colorable cage for damages. In order to test this view of the
subject, suppose the plaintiff (as -it actually occurred in one of the
counts in this case) had merely charged in his declaration that the
railroad company, while in the regular pursuit of their lawful business, had ran over and killed her cow, without any charge of negligence or misconduct on their part. Can it be doubted that such a
count would be demurrable ? If, then, an allegation of negligence or
want of skill be a material allegation, is i not the duty of the plaintiff
to prove it? I deem it unnecessary to say more upon this topic, or
to notice the reasoning founded upon the supposed inconvenience
and difficulty on the part of the stock owner to prove the want of
diligence and caution on the part of the agents of the company.
These are considerations which might with some plausibility be
addressed to the Legislature. But the courts of the country must
expound the law as it is. For the foregoing reasons the judgment
of the county court must be reversed.

HAWLEY vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

In the Circuit Court of JYheeling, Virginia.
HAWLEY vS. BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAThHOAD COMPANy.

1

1. 'When an employee enters into the service of a railroad company, he assumes the
risks incident to such employment, such as the carelessness or unskillfulness of
his co-employees, when they were skilful and careful at the time of their employment.

2. In the selection of servants the company is bound, in such case, only to the
extent of care which prudent men ordinarily exercise.
3. When a company is responsible for neglect or carelessness of co-employee.

Hawley was conductor of a train in the service of the company,
and running between Wheeling and Benwood. In entering the
Benwood junction, a side-switch was left open by the carelessness of
a switch tender, or of a conductor of the regulating engine, by
reason of which the train under the conduction of the plaintiff ran
off of its proper track on to the siding, and came in collision with
a train thereon, whereby the plaintiff was seriously and dangerously

injured.
Good and Russel, for plaintiff.
W-heate and Hunter,for defendant.
Instructions were asked by the counsel for the defendant, which
the court declined to give, but gave the following instructions, which
were acquiesced in by the counsel for defendant, but objected to by
the counsel for plaintiff.
THOMPSON, J.-lst. The railroad company is responsible for
care, such care as prudent men ordinarily exercise in their own
affairs, in the selection of careful and skilful servants or employees,
fitted for the various employments each is to fill.
2d. If the employees connected with the accident or collision,
which resulted in the injury to the plaintiff, were actually careful
and skilful at the time of their selection by the company for the
duties respectively assigned them, this fulfills the obligation of the
company in selecting such employees.
3d. When an employee enters into a contract of hiring with such
a company', he assumes, with such relation to the company, the
I Quarterly Law Journal
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natural or ordinary risks incident to such employment, and among
these, such as arise from the carelessness or unskillfulness of his
fellow employees in and about the business of their common employment, when such co-employees have been selected as first aforesaid,
but except as hereinafter limited and enlarged.
4th. If the plaintiff was injured by the carelessness or neglect of
Michael Connor, alleged to have been the switch-tender at the point
where the collision and injury occurred, and as such was a co-employee with the plaintiff, placed there to discharge a particular duty
assigned him, the neglect of which occasioned the injury complained
of, yet, if the plaintiff knew, or had a reasonable opportunity of
informing himself of any general carelessness or unskillfulness of
his said co-employee in and about this special duty, and this special,
duty was connected with the special employment of the plaintiff,,
and the plaintiff continued in the service of the company thereafter,.
he is to be presumed, by remaining in such employment, in the.
absence of any notice of such carelessness or unskillfulness to the
company, or its officer having the power of removal, to have assumed:
the risk arising therefrom'.
This instruction applies to the case of Shingleton, another co-employee, (whose duty was claimed, in regard to the negligence complained of, as identical with that of Connor) substituting-Shingleton's
name for that of Connor.
5th. If the jury are satisfied that Connor, the co-employee whose
neglect is complained of as having been the cause- of the collision
which occasioned the injury to the plaintiff, had been selected with
due care by the company, and it was a part of his duty to attend
the switch in question, but he was careless in the discharge of his
said duty, and that the officer of the company having the power of
removal had notice of this neglect of duty, and neglected to remove
him, and that the collision in this instance occurred so soon thereafter that the plaintiff cannot reasonably be presumed to have adopted
the risk of continuing his employment with this co-employee, then
the company is responsible for such neglect of duty by said employee,.
provided the company is not excused under other instructions here-.
inbefore or hereinafter given to the jury.. But, if the company used..
23
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due care in selecting Connor, and had no notice of such carelessness,
if such existed; or if he was careless of that duty, so assigned him,
and this carelessness was known to the plaintiff, and he continued
in his employment; or if only during their common employment
Connor became careless, and his superior officer, as aforesaid, was
informed thereof, and neglected to remove him, and the plaintiff,
with notice thereof, continued his employment, under circumstances
that it may reasonably be presumed that he continued his employment notwithstanding such neglect; or, if after such notice given
and a refusal by the said superior officer to discharge this employee,
the plaintiff, with knowledge thereof, continued his employment, he
must be presumed to have adopted such employment with such risk,
and is without remedy against the company.
This instruction applies to the instance of Shingleton mutatis
mutandis.
6th. Such employees are engaged in a common undertaking in
-which the safety of all depends on the care and skill with which each
-one shall perform his appropriate function, office, or duty, and each
is bound to the careful and skillful discharge of his several employment, and if the plaintiff, by his violation of the general instructions prescribed by the company for regulating his conduct, and of
which he had had reasonable opportunities of obtaining a knowledge,
-or of which he had actual knowledge; or, in violation of specific in,structions directly communicated to him by one having authority,
.and whom, under. the circumstances, it was his duty to recognize as
having such authority, and the company has furnished the means of
,executing any such instructions, as aforesaid; or, by any neglect of
general duty incident to his employment, or unskillfulness on his
-partin the exercise of his employment, he contributed to his own
injury, he is without remedy against the company.
Tth. If the jury are satisfied that the plaintiff was not in his
p-roper place at the time of the collision, and that if he had been in
his proper place he should have had a light with him, and that by
being there so equipped he could, by the exercise of ordinary
.prudence and the ordinary skill requisite for his employment, have
Irevented the collision or escaped the injury to himself, then the
company is not responsible.

COAKI Y vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

In tie Suvreme Court of Pennsylvania.
At Nisi Prius, before Strong, 3. March, 1858.
COAR

VS. THE NORTH PENNSYLVXNTA

RAILROAD COMPANY.

1. It is a clear and general principle that the principal is liable for the negligence
of his agent.
2. An action under our act of 1855, (Brightly's Digest, p. 1128,) providing a remedy
in case of death by violence, or negligence, can only be maintained by the persons
enumerated in the act itself, viz: the husband, the widow, the parents, the
children.
3. In estimating the damages, the injury done to the party living, caused by the
death, is the measure; and no compensation can be claimed for the suffering of
the decedent.
4. No compensation can be allowed for the distress and anguish which the plaintiff
may be supposed to have suffered; but any expenses to which the plaintiff may
have been subjected, should be included in the verdict.
5. Suggestions as to the pecuniary value of life; estimable value of life, must be
determined by the jury.
6. Exemplary damages should not be given, unless the defendant has been guilty of
fraud, oppression, gross negligence, malice, &c.

This was an action to recover damages against the defendants
for the life of the daughter of the plaintiff. The said child, (Cathanine Coakley,) lost her life on the morning of July 17th, 1856,
in the deplorable accident on the North Pennsylvania Railroad, which occurred on that day. The child intended to go on an
excursion with her Sunday School companions, who were going on
an excursion to a place called FortWashington, some twelve or fifteen
miles from Philadelphia. The train of cars in which the child was
riding, reached in safety a point upon the line of the railroad, about
two miles from the place of their destination. There the train in which
Catharine Coakley was seated, came in collision with another train
of the defendants, and in consequence Catharine was fatally injured.
She survived the accident until the morning of the next day.
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For the plaintiff, Messrs. S. H. Perkinsand Wm.L. f._rst.
For the defendants, Messrs. St. Ceorge T. Gampbell and Gee. N.
'Wharton.
The following charge was delivered to the jury by
STRONG, J.-The cars belonged to the defendants, and they were
responsible for the negligence of their agents. The defendants,
then, are liable, and they are liable to the plaintiff. The question
for you is, and it is the only inquiry in this cause, what is the neasure of that liability?
In order to determine it, it becomes necessary to look at the Acts of
Assembly which authorize such an action as the present to be
brought. Until within a recent period, where death had ensued
from the wrongful act of another, whether from violence or from
negligence, no civil action could be maintained against the wrong
doer, either by the personal representatives or the relatives of the
deceased. I will not stop to state the reasons for this; but such
was the law. And even if a suit had been commenced before the
death of the party injured, it died with the party, and could not be
carried on by his administrator. About twelve years since, however, a statute was passed in England, which, in that country,
changed this rule of law. Since that time the example set in England has been followed by several of our sister States, and similar
statutes have been passed. In 1851 the legislature of this State
passed such an act, and in 1855 yet another, designating the persons who may sue. The phraseology of the English statute, that
of our sister States, and our own, is slightly varied, but the purpose
of them all seems to have been substantially the same. Our act of
1851, in one section, provided that where suit had been commenced
by the person injured, in his lifetime, it should not die with him,
but might be carried on by his executors or administrators. The
next section, and the one which is the foundation of the present case,
is as follows: "wherever death shall be occasioned by unlawful
violence or negligence, and no suit for damages be brought by the
party injured, during his or her life, the widow of any such deceased,
or if there be no widow, the personal representatives may maintain
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an action for, and recover, damages for the death thus occasioned."
The act of 1855 takes away from the personal representatives this
right to bring suit and recover damages, and allows it to the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased, and to no other
relative.
It now becomes necessary to inquire for what the legislature provided that the action should be brought. The language of the act
is " damages for the death." Was it for the wrong and injury to
the decedent, or the wrong and injury to the persons to whom the
right of action is given? This becomes a natural inquiry in this
case. For, if the action is given for the wrong and injury to the
decedent, then the plaintiffs cannot recover for any expenses to
which they have been subjected in consequence of the death of their
child, nor for any loss of service or society, because these expenses
and loss were no part of the injury done to Catharine Coakley, and
she could not recover for them had she brought suit in her lifetime.
If, on the other hand, the damages to be recovered are those sustained by the parent, then the sufferings and pain of the child cannot be considered, for that suffering was no part of the damages
done to the parents.
Under the British statute, of which I have already spoken, the
action is brought for the injury done to the relative in whose behalf
the suit is given. So it is in New York, in Ohio, in Illinois, and in
Indiana, and, so far as I know, wherever similar statutes are found.
The acts in those States differ in words, as I have said, but their
general object is one. Wherever, then, this innovation has been
made upon the common law, the rule is that the damages to be
recovered are those sustained by the survivor to whom the right of
action is given. Our statute, though slightly differing in words from
that of England and our sister States (the great difference being in its
brevity) does not differ in signification. Nor does the decision of the
Supreme Court in Penna.B. B. Co. vs. .e6Olosley, 11 Harr., 526,
give to it a different construction. That was a suit brought by an administrator, and decided before the act of 1855 was passed. The
question we are now considering was not involved in the case. You
will notice who the persons are to 'whom the right of action is given for
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damages for the death. They are the husband, the widow, the
children, the parents. All these have by law relative rights in the
person whose death has been occasioned by violence or negligence.
The husband has a legal right to the services and society of his wife.
The wife has a legal right to the support and protection of the husband. The children have a legal right to the support and maintenance of the parents. And the parents have a right to the services
of the child. But here the act of assembly stops. No other relative
can bring a suit. No other relative has any legally recognized relative rights in the decedent. Not even a brother or sister. This can
hardly be accidental.
I am therefore of opinion, and I so instruct you, that in estimating
the damages you should confine your attention to the damages
which have been caused to the parents by the death of the child.
Consequently, you cannot give damages for the pain and suffering
which Catharine experienced previous to her death.
What damages, then, have the parents sustained? This is for
your consideration-I can only give to you some rules by which you
should be guided. I observe, then, first, that the damages given
should not be speculative. Difficult as the task may be, it is your
duty to endeavor to ascertain what real injury the plaintiffs have sustained from the death of the child. This you will not ascertain by
inquiring what you would be willing to lose a child for. No amount
of money would buy such willingness from a true-hearted father. If
the picture of a loved friend be destroyed wrongfully, the measure of
damages is not the price which affection would set upon it.. The
pecuniary value of affection is not to be estimated by legal scales.
I instruct you, secondly, that nothing can be allowed as a solace
for the distress and anguish which you may suppose the plaintiffs
suffered in consequence of the misfortune of their child. Great as
that may have been, it is incapable of appreciation, or of any legal
estimate. Every legal wrong, even the non-payment of debt, when
it becomes due, inflicts inconvenience, often distress, upon the party
injured, but this is not generally an element in the estimation of
damages.
These parents are, however, entitled to compensation for any
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expenses to which they have been subjected in consequence of the
death of the child, and such you should give them. There is no
direct evidence in regard to such expenses, but you may infer from
the facts of the case that they have been incurred, and whatever you
believe from the evidence that they were, should be included in your
verdict. You will recollect that from the evidence it appears that
the plaintiffs have already received one hundred and six dollars.
You will also include in your estimate of the damages, the
loss which these plaintiffs have sustained of the services of their
daughter Catharine, at least until she would have arrived at the age
of twenty-one years. She was in her fifteenth year. The father
being bound to support and educate the child, is entitled to the
services of such child, to the earnings and the profits of the services,
and these are a legitimate and proper subject for your consideration.
But beyond these considerations, the life of this child had a value,
a pecuniary value, which you must endeavor to ascertain from the
best lights that you have, and guided by a conscientious judgment.
Upon this branch of the case I can give you very little assistance.
In some respects, life is inestimable, against it, property, and even
the world itself is not to be balanced. But the value of one's life
to another is more susceptible of calculation. It is not to be made
by annuity tables. In my judgment, a material consideration is,
probably, the principal consideration-the loss of the comfort and
satisfaction which flows from the society of the person in whose life
the plaintiffs were interested. Of that comfort and enjoyment the
negligence of the defendants has deprived them. This you may
consider in your estimate of damages. Whatever was the estimable value of the life of Catharine, is for you to determine.
These, it seems then, gentlemen, are the elements-the different
considerations which should address themselves to your consideration, in determining what amount of damages should be awarded.
The plaintiffs, however, claim exemplary damages, and upon this.
I have a few observations to make.
In all actions, the general rule is compensation. The object of
the law is to make the injured party whole; to give him an equivalent in money for the right of which he has been deprived. By his
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suit he asks satisfaction, and he asks no more. But in cases where
the defendant has been guilty of fraud or malice, or oppression, or
negligence, so gross as to be equivalent to wanton or willful injury,
and which, therefore, is malicious, a jury may go beyond compensation. This is not because the plaintiff is entitled to any thing more
than will make him whole, but because the law, in this indirect way,
seeks to punish the offender, and set an example, a beacon before the
community, to warn against the commission of similar offences. I
will not say to you that you may not, in this case, go beyond compensation, and give exemplary damages, but I feel it my duty to
say that, in my opinion, you should not. This is not a case of
fraud, nor of malice, nor of oppression, nor do I think it is a case of
reckless negligence.
The defendants, personally, were guilty of no negligence at all.
They were compelled to act through agents. The uncontradicted
evidence is that they appointed competent, skillful and prudent
engineers and conductors. They gave to them most rigid instructions ; instructions which, if they had been obeyed, would have prevented the possibility of such an accident as occurred. From some
cause, it is unnecessary to determine what, these instructions were
not literally obeyed, and the consequence was the fearful disaster
which has occasioned this suit. The defendants, after all, are the
greatest sufferers. They could have done no more than they did,
to avert the calamity. It is hardly to be supposed, that the conductors and engineers wantonly exposed their own lives, as well as
the lives of those under their care. I cannot see in all this, proof
of such gross negligence as is evincive of a heart regardless of social
duty; a bad heart, deserving to be held up to the community as an
example of evil doing. This is, however, for you.
I have no more to say. You will take the case, and, guided by
the principles which I have stated, assess the damages for the
plaintiffs.
The jury found for the plaintiff $400."
I

To this charge both the plaintiff's and defendants' counsel excepted.

The

,plaintiff also moved for a new trial. Should the Court in ]anc pass upon the legal
questions involved in this charge, we shall present the opinion to our readers.
Ed. Am. Law Reg.

O'BRIEN vs. RAILROAD COMPANY.

In the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
At Nisi Prius, before Woodward, S.
O'BRIEN VS. THE 'HILADELPHIA, WILMINGTON, AND BALTIMORE R. R. CO.'

1. If the plaintiff's injury is attributable in any degree to his own negligence, he
cannot recover.
2. Negligence is the want of that care which men of common sense and common
prudence ordinarily exercise in their employments.
3. If one who is about to cross a railroad at grades, on which locomotives run. he
is bound to stop and listen, and look in both directions, before he allows his team
to set foot within the rails, and an omission to do so is negligence on his part.

This was an action to recover damages for injuries to the person
and property of the plaintiff, by a collision with a locomotive of
defendants. The accident occurred at the crossing of a public
highway, on which the plaintiff was driving his cart, and the railroad of the defendants.
Mr. -.

. Brewster, for plaintiff, presented the following points:

1. That the defendants are -bound, -while running a locomotive
over the public highway of a city, to use every precaution necessary for the safety of the property and lives of-the citizens.
2. That this duty is specially obligatory upon approaching and
turning corners of public highways in a city.
3. That amongst other matters of precaution, the speed of the
engine should be so regulated and controlled at the intersection of
public streets in a city, that the train can be stopped, if necessary
for the protection of the property or lives of those going along the
public highway.
4. That it is incumbent on the defendants, in such circumstances,
to give warning of their approach.
5. That the ordinance of Moyamensing, prohibiting a greater
rate of speed than 12 miles an hour, does not authorize the defendants to go at that rate around curves and at intermediate sections
of public highways, if that speed is dangerous to the public.
6. That the care required of the plaintiff is, that degree of care
'We are indebted to the learned counsel of the defendants for the report of this
case.-Eds. Am. Law Beg.
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which may reasonably be expected from a person in the plaintiff's
situation.
7. That if there was negligence on the part both of the plaintiff
and of the defendants, and the plaintiff, by the exercise of ordinary
care could have avoided the injury, and he did not exercise such
care, and thereby contributed in any degree to the injury, he could
not recover ; but, that if the plaintiff could not by the exercise of
ordinary care, have avoided the injury, the want of such care on
his part would not preclude him from recovery.
Messrs. St. George T. Campbell and I. Raziehurst for the defendants, requested the judge to instruct the jury as follows :
1. That there is no evidence that the plaintiff was placed in the
Pennsylvania hospital by the defendants or their agents, and
therefore, in estimating the damages, if any are recoverable, the
jury cannot include any injury or suffering of the plaintiff, caused
by any disease there contracted.
2. That there is no evidence that the injury to the eyes of the
plaintiff was caused by, connected with, or consequent upon, any
act of the defendant, and the jury cannot include any injury or
suffering of the plaintiff in respect thereto, in their estimate of
damages, if any are recoverable.
8. That even if the jury believe that the servants of the defendants were guilty of carelessness, yet if the plaintiff was also himself negligent, he cannot recover.
4. That if the plaintiff could have avoided the collision by the
exercise of common prudence or ordinary care, he cannot recover.
5. That whenever the relative position and levels of a railway
and cross-road will permit, it is the duty, and common prudence and
ordinary care require of every person having control of a vehicle
about to cross the track, to look up and down the railway before
passing upon or over it.
6. That when the position and grades of a cross-road and railway track are such, that the person controlling a vehicle about to
cross the latter, can see an approaching train a sufficient distance
to enable him to stop his vehicle before reaching the track, it
is his duty, and he is required in the exercise of ordinary care
and common prudence, to look along the line of the railway in
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both directions, and himself stop to prevent a collision, and if he
omits to do so, he can recover no damages for any consequences
that may result to him therefrom.
7. That the placing of the locomotive and gravel train upon the
southern of the double tracks, owned by the defendants below the
crossing at which the plaintiff was injured, was a lawful use thereof
by. them, and that the position thereof does not, in any respect,
affect the duties and obligations of any person about to cross such
double track road, but that the same remain as stated in the fifth
and sixth points; and the fact, that the attention of any person
about to cross such tracks is attracted to such locomotive, whether
standing on the adjoining track or in motion, will not excuse him
from the obligation to stop, to look in both directions, or to listen
before attempting to pass over such double track.
The charge of the court was delivered by
J.-This is an action in which the plaintiff claims
damages for an injury inflicted upon his person and property by the
servants of the defendants. It is in proof, that at the time of the
occurrence complained of, both parties were prosecuting their ordinary and lawful occupations on these intersecting highways. Both
had the right to pursue these highways, but this right was to
be so exercised by each as not to hurt the other; and the roads
were capable of being so used. They were designed, both of them,
to promote the public convenience and welfare, and if they cannot
co-exist harmlessly, they have failed of the object of their institution, and one or the other should be abated as a common nuisance.
The plaintiff invited to travel the open street, and the company
authorized by law to run cars on their road, could not injure each
other if both were careful; if neither was regardless of the social
duty which he owed the other.
The fact of collision, then, proves negligence in somebody. It
may be the negligence of the company; the negligence of the
plaintiff, or the mutual negligence of both parties. The jury are
to determine from all the evidence, where the negligence attaches.
The plaintiff can recover only for the negligence of the company.
If his injury was attributable in any degree to negligence on his
WOODWARD,
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own part, he is not entitled to damages. Though the company's
agents may have been in fault, and in greatest fault, yet if the
plaintiff contributed by his own carelessness, to his injury, the law
will not adjust the balance of blame between them, nor award
damages to either, for the result of their compound negligence.
Every man is bound to take reasonable care of himself, and when
he seeks redress for personal injuries, he must show that he has
done so.
This term negligence, which we use so much, must be clearly defined to the jury. It is sometimes defined as the want of ordinary
care, a definition which stands in as much need of definition as
the thing itself. Negligence may be described as the want of that
care which men of common sense and common prudence ordinarily
exercise in like employments. You are to have regard to the business in which O'Brien and the Railroad Company were engaged
when the accident occurred, and to ask yourselves which of them
omitted that degree of care which men of ordinary prudence exercise when engaged in similar employments.
First, as to the defendants; the jury will consider whether the
train was conducted as a prudent man would have conducted it in
the suburbs of a great city. Is notice usually given of the progress and approach of trains where railroads run through densely
populated districts, and cross numerous streets ? Did the defendants ring and whistle ? Was their speed reasonable, all things considered ? These are questions for the jury. As to the signals, the
evidence is conflicting. The engineer, the conductor, a passenger,
and one or two other witnesses, swear that the bell was rung from
the time they left the depot, and the engineer says the whistle was
sounded when the peril of the plaintiff was discovered, and before
the collision took place. Several witnesses produced by the plaintiff, testify that they either live in the neighborhood, or happened
to be there at the time, and that they heard neither bell nor whistle.
Generally, affirmative evidence is more reliable than negative.
Signals which people are accustomed to hear, are often disregarded
when actually given, and it is more probable that these witnesses
are mistaken who say they did not hear the bell, than it is that the
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engineer is mistaken, whose business it was to ring it. Yet it is
argued, with what force the jury will say, that the engineer, whose
duty it was to ring, and who generally did so, must be understood
as speaking of his belief, founded in his general practice, rather
than of his recollection of what he did on a particular day, so long
past as November, 1854.
A similar discrepancy exists in the evidence as to whether an
omnibus intercepted the plaintiff's view up the road. His witnesses
locate the omnibus between him and the approaching train, whilst
the witnesses on the part of the defence, deny that there was any
omnibus there. Now the driver of the omnibus, and the passenger
who was in it, are more likely to be correct about its location, than
others, who, though situated so they might have seen it, had their
attention directed to other objects, and failed to notice it. As to
the speed of the train, the evidence proves that it was less than
twelve miles an hour, which is the rate allowed by the ordinance of
the district of Moyamensing, and it is argued that this is decisive
on this point. I do not think so. The rate limited by the ordinance is to be considered, but the question of negligence does not
depend on municipal ordinances, but on the general experience and
observation of the jury, regard being had to all the circumstances
of the case. The velocity of the train may have been within the
ordinance, and yet in the actual condition of facts, unreasonable
and imprudent. In other circumstances, a speed beyond the rate
of the ordinance, might not be deemed reckless. The jury are not
to disregard the rate legalized by the ordinance, but they are to
decide, in view of all the circumstances, whether the train was conducted with such speed, and such signals, as prudent men ordinarily
employ in such places. If they find that it was, there is an end of
the case, for in that manner the law allows the company to use their
road. And an injury that results from a lawful and prudent exercise of their rights, must be referred to the negligence of some
other party, and cannot subject them to damages.
But if the jury find that the company was not faultless, that they
did or omitted anything that would constitute negligence as I have
defined it, the next inquiry will relate to the conduct of the
plaintiff.
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He was a carter, and the same general principles apply to him
as to the defendants. He was bound to pursue his business with
all that regard to the safety of himself and others, which prudent
men commonly employ in like occupations. Did he demean himself in that manner? In answer to the 6th and Tth points on the
part of the defendants, I instruct the jury that a carter, or any
man having charge of a team, who is about to cross a railroad at
grade on which locomotives run, is bound to stop and listen, and
look in both directions, before he permits his team to set foot within
the rails, and omission to do so is negligence on his part. This rule
of law is demanded by a due regard to the safety of life and property, both his own and that which is passing on the railroad.
From the evidence, it is perfectly apparent that the plaintiff could have seen the approaching train if he had looked.
If he saw it, it was extreme rashness in him to allow his lead horse
to advance so far; and if he did not see it, it must have been because he did not look.
I state the general rule, but whether it is applicable to the plaintiff in the circumstances which surround him, is for the jury. A
few yards on his right, some witnesses think seventy, there was a
gravel train, with a locomotive attached, standing on one of the
tracks, and liable to start any moment, and on his left, according to
his witnesses, was the omnibus in close proximity to the crossing.
Now, for these circumstances the plaintiff was in nowise responsible, and the question is, whether they constituted any excuse for
his not looking up the road. Had he listened he could not have
heard the bell or whistle, for as we are now contemplating the case,
it must be presumed they were not sounded. I have already instructed the jury, that if they believe these signals were given, ahd
the speed was reasonable, the plaintiff was bound to take notice of
them. If the jury so find, they will not reach this part of the case,
but if they find the signals were not given, and are thus brought to
the consideration of the plaintiff's conduct, he must be regarded as
subject to the general rule-bound to look as well as listen, unless
the circumstances, to which I have adverted, were sufficient, in the
judgment of the jury, to excuse him. It is argued that the gravel
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train was on its appropriate track, and lawfully standing where it
was. Doubtless. But if the company so engaged the plaintiff's
attention to the gravel train, as to divert it from the approaching
passenger train, can they allege that his failure to see the latter was
negligence in him ? I refer this question to the jury.. If the jury
see nothing in this circumstance to excuse the plaintiff for not looking out for the passenger train coming at its customary time, then
there was negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and he cannot
recover, even if there was negligence on the part of the company.
If, however, they think the general rule of law was not applicable
to him in his peculiar situation, then the failure of the engineer to
give the accustomed signals was negligence for which the company
would be responsible, and the plaintiff is entitled to have his damages assessed. The only remaining subject to which I may address
a few words, is the measure of the damages.
The damages, if any, should be merely compensatory, and not
vindictive. The plaintiff was carried to the hospital to have his
broken leg cured, and there, it is said, he contracted ophthalmia, by
reason of which he lost the sight of one eye altogether, the other
being also much impaired. It is shown that there was no such disease in the hospital, and the plaintiff has failed to show that the
injury to his eyes was a consequence of the collision on the railroad. Damages are not, therefore, to be given him on account of
his eyes, but for the horse that was killed, for the loss of his time,
and for the expenses attending the cure of his fractured limb, he is
entitled to recover, if under the evidence, and on the principles of
law that have been explained, the jury consider him entitled to their
verdict.
[The judge then proceeded to notice the special points submitted
by counsel on each side, and declined to charge as requested in the
first three points on the part of the plaintiff, but repeated the principles of law as contained in the foregoing charge.
The 4th, 5th, and 6th points of the plaintiff, and the first part
of the 7th point, were affirmed, but instead of the latter part of the
7th point, the jury were referred to the charge.

LEITCH vs. STEAMER GEORGE LAW.

The defendants' points were all affirmed except the 7th, which
was answered with a modification, as in the charge.]
Whereupon the counsel for both plaintiff and defendants excepted
before the verdict, and prayed that the charge be filed, which was
done.
. The jury found a verdict for defendants.

In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.
THOMAS LEITCH vs. THE STEAMER GEORGE LAW.

The steamship George Law coming into the port of New York, was spoken by a
licensed pilot, who offered his services as such legally licensed pilot, which were
refused; he then demanded a certain sum, claiming to be entitled to it under
the pilotage laws enacted by State statute, and libeled the ship: hed, that he had
no lien, and that the ship was not liable.

The libel alleges that on the 12th of June, 1857, the libelant was
a pilot, duly licensed and qualified according to the laws of the
State of New Jersey and the Statutes of the United States, to
pilot vessels to and from the port of New York, by way of Sandy
Hook; that being then on board the pilot-boat Thomas H. Smith,
upon the high seas, and within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of this court, about eight miles off Barnegat, seeing the said
steamship George Law (sailing under a register) approaching, drawing thirteen feet of water, and bound to the port of New York, said
steamship not having been before that spoken by a licensed pilot,
he immediately spoke said steamship and offered her master his
services as pilot, to pilot said steamship into the port of New York
as the master of said steamship might direct, which offer and services
aforesaid the master refused, and that thereby the libellant became
entitled, by law, to demand and receive from the master and owner
of said ship the sum of $89 65 ; that neither the master nor owner
of said ship has paid that sum, but it yet remains, though often
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demanded, due and unpaid. Wherefore the libelant prayed process of attachment against the ship, &c. The owner of the ship
intervened in the cause, and filed his exceptive allegations to the
libel: 1. That the libel and the matters therein set forth are not
sufficient in law to constitute a lien upon the ship; 2. That the libel
does not state any service rendered to the ship, which constitutes a
lien; and 3. That the libel claims a penalty, and that the claim is
not within the jurisdiction of the court.
Mr. _Zrudgett, for libelant.
Messrs. Bebee, Dean, and Donohue, for claimants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BETTS, J.-Congress has not enacted specific regulations governing the subject of pilotage, into or out of the United States.
The act of Aug. 7, 1789, sec. 4, provides that all pilots in the
bays, inlets, rivers, harbors and ports of the United States, shall
continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the
States respeetively wherein such pilots may be, or with such law,
as the States may respectively hereafter enact for the purpose, until
further legislative provision shall be made by Congress. 1 Stat. atLarge, 54.
And by the act of March 2, 1837, it is declared that it shall and
may be lawful for the master or commander of any vessel coming
into or going out of any port, situate upon the waters whieh are
the boundary between two States, to employ pilots duly authorited'
by the laws of either of the States bounded on said waters, to pilot
said vessel to or from said port, any law, usage or custom to the
contrary notwithstanding. 5 Stat. at Large, 153. This later actgrew out of the difficulties subsisting at this port between pilots
licensed under the laws of this State and New Jersey.
In this case the libelant was a pilot, licensed according to the.
laws of the State of New Jersey, and a grave question might perhaps arise whether his privileges and rights under that license are
to be determined in this case by the laws of that State or those of'
New York, as the libel does not aver that the right he sets up hereis given him by the laws of both States; but the decision will be.
24
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placed in this instance upon other considerations, and that point will
not enter into the judgment rendered.
It would seem manifest that Congress, in the enactments referred
to, contemplated nothing beyond the official doings and liabilities of
pilots as subjects of regulations by State laws, which were to be
adopted and enforced by the authority of the federal government.
It is declared that "all pilots in the ports of the United States shall
continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the
States, respectively, wherein such pilots shall be." Pilots, as public
officers, and the acts of pilots, are provisionally admitted to be
governed by the regulations of State laws until Congress shall itself
legislate further upon the matter. Subsidiary provisions in State
laws, -which tend to the advantage of pilots in the enjoyment of
their offices, would not seem to be necessarily regulations of the
offices themselves, or of the incumbents of the offices; they might
-rather, as they purport to be in the laws of the State in question,
.(Act of April 8, 1857, and of Feb. 19, 1819, §20,) mulcts and
,penalties inflicted upon third parties, for acts or omissions in derogation of the policy of the laws themselves.
This point has been ably discussed, in some of its bearings, in
Cooley vs. The Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia,
12 How. 299, and decided by a closely divided court, in so far as
-to determine that the State laws governing pilots are laws regulating
:navigation and not commerce. The act of Congress of 1781, therefore, constitutes such State laws laws of the United States to that
effect, and also as such, no doubt, supplies them the force and remedies applicable to statutes of the United States, in declaring and
securing the right to pilotage fees when pilotage service, offered as
provided in this act, is refused. On that acceptation the statute
*of a State, subjecting the owners of vessels to half pilotage fees or
other penalty for refusing to employ pilots to navigate their vessels,
- is no infringement of the Constitution of the United States, and may
be enforced by suits in the State courts, and probably in the federal
*courts also. But the Supreme Court has nowhere determined the
method of procedure by which the statutory regulation may be
enforced, and, accordingly, the forms of process authorized in the
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United States courts must be used, and those peculiar to the State
judicatories. 1 Paine, 620. The rule of decision, in many cases
of jurisdiction, is derived by the national tribunals from State laws,
but the law of practice in the United States courts is universally
dependent upon the authority of federal enactment or usages. The
adoption of a general principle of law from the State code or its
customs, never carries with it into the United States jurisprudence
the remedies or processes through which it was there sanctioned
and executed. 11 Peters, 175 ; 14 id. 67; 10 Wheat. 1. If,
then, there is in the State law a provision making such reward to
pilots a charge upon the vessels, when masters or owners refused
pilotage service, it would not follow that the remedy against the
vessel would attend the execution of the law in the federal courts.
The allowance made by the State law is not the 1)ilotage-it is
a remuneration exacted from masters and owners of vessels personally,
because pilotage service is refused by them, and in that way the
reward the officer would be entitled to as compensation for his preparing and offering himself to the performance of this duty is withheld, and thus a provision of law highly important to the public
interests of trade and navigation is frustrated. It is not necessary
to consider whether it be competent for the Legislature to impose this
charge as a lien on vessels. It is not made such by positive law, and
it does not become such by the marine law. The decision of the
Supreme Court, before referred to, (12 How. 109,) rests upon the
doctrine that the State laws are regulations of the subject of pilotage
and of the owners and masters of vessels in their transactions in
relation to pilotage, and is nowhere referred to as affecting the vessels
in rem. The liability of the masters and owners to this mulct for
a personal delinquency would no way impose a liability upon the
vessel to satisfy their obligation; and as the law does not impose
the obligation on the ship, no action can be maintained in rem to
cover the demand.
Besides, this libel is in personam only. It does not charge a
liability of the ship to the claim, and although it prays process and
a decree against her therefor, there is no averment of a lien which
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would entitle the libelant to take a decree in condemnation of the
ship.
The exceptive allegations to the sufficiency of the libel and the
right of action against the ship upon the averments of the libel are,
therefore, allowed, and the libel is dismissed, with costs.

In the District Court of Philade~phia.
WILSON Vs. STEWART.
1. An authority delegated to an attorney from three trustees, having a power
coupled with an interest, and from the survivors and survivor of them to sell and
convey lands, is not revoked by the death of one of the trustees.
2. Such delegation being joint and several, the attorney is invested with the full
powers of the surviving trustees, so as to pass both the beneficial and the legal
estates.
3. A power which includes a future interest is effectual to pass a subsequently
acquired title.

The material facts of this case were as follows:
By an ante-nuptial settlement made in England, in April, 1843,
certain real estate, situate in Pennsylvania, belonging to a feme
sole, was granted, released, and confirmed unto three trustees residing in England, and to their heirs, to hold to them and their
heirs and assigns in trust for various purposes, and inter alia that
the trustees " or the survivors or survivor of them, or the heirs of
such survivor, their or his assigns, or other the trustees or trustee
for the time being," &c., should sell and dispose of the real estate
thereby released and assured upon fee farm or ground rents, or
otherwise. And for effecting sales, to execute such powers of
attorney and other powers, authorities, deeds, &c., as to the trustees or trustee for the time being should appear advisable or expedient, with a right to all purchasers upon fee farm or ground rents,
of redeeming and extinguishing such ground rents upon terms to
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be fixed: with the proviso that it should be lawful for the trustees
or trustee for the time being, from time to time to appoint "such
person or persons as shall by the trustees or trustee for the time
being be nominated in that behalf to be the attorneys or attorney,
agent or agents, receiver or receivers, manager or managers of
them the said trustees or trustee for the time being, of these presents to act and assist in and about the execution and performance
of the several trusts, powers, and provisions in these presents contained," &c. &c., "and to delegate and give to such attorney or
attorneys, and to his or their substitute or substitutes, all such
powers, discretion, and authorities, to the most full and ample extent, and of the most full and ample nature in and about or in
relation to the premises, and the selling, leasing, and managing the
same," &c.&c., with power likewise to the trustees or trustee for
the time being, to revoke any such appointment, and to exercise
the same power of appointing attorneys, &c. from time to time
toties quoties during the continuance of the trust.
By a letter of attorney, the trustees, in the month of June of the
same year (1843), in pursuance, exercise, and execution of all the
powers, trusts and authorities declared and set forth in the marriage
settlement, constituted and appointed G. C., of the City of Philadelphia, the attorney for them, "and the survivors and survivor of
them and in their and every or any of their names or name inter
alia to sell and convey the said lands in consideration of the reservation of an annual ground rent, with or without a clause for the
extinguishment of such rent by the payment of a stipulated sum of
money, and upon the payment of such sum to execute a sufficient
release of the same.
In 1853, the three trustees by their attorney G. C. sold and conveyed a large lot of ground, reserving to themselves and the survivors and survivor of them, and the heirs and assigns of the
survivor, as the consideration therefor, an anuual ground rent with
a clause for the extinguishment thereof at any time upon the payment of a given sum.
One of the three trustees died in 1855, leaving the remaining two
as the surviving trustees under the aforementioned marriage settle-
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ment. No revocation or renewal of G. C.'s authority was afterwards made by the surviving trustees, and the purchaser subsequently, to wit, in 1857, paid the stipulated amount to G. C. for
the extinguishment of the rent, and received from him, as the
attorney of the two surviving trustees, a deed releasing and extinguishing the rent.
The question submitted for the decision of the court was, whether
under the powers and authorities contained in the marriage settlement, the release and extinguishment of the ground rent by G. C.,
as the attorney of the surviving trustees, was effectual or not ?
Chapman Biddle, for plaintiff.
Faln, for defendant.
SHARSWOOD, P. J.-The main question presented upon this case
stated, appears to be whether a power to sell lands executed by
trustees under a marriage settlement is revoked Jy the death of one
of them? By the deed, the estate is conveyed to and vested in the
trustees in fee simple as joint-tenants. Upon the death of one, the
estate survived. The power of attorney constitutes G. C. their
attorney for them, " and each and every or any one or more of
them," and expressly provides for the case of survivorship "for
them (the said trustees) and the survivors or survivor of them, and
in their and every or any of their names or name" inter alia to
sell and convey, &c. If indeed the death of one absolutely revokes
the power as to all, then it would matter not what words were
inserted in the power; the revocation would operate on these words
as well as the others; the power would cease and be void. But
supposing the death of one to revoke the power as to him, is there
any principle or authority to compel us to hold that it is also ipso
facto revoked as to the others, and if it is not that, it cannot operate to affect the entire estate now vested in the survivors.
The uniform language of the books is, that joint-tenants hold per
my et per tout. During the time they hold jointly, neither of them
has an estate in any particular part. The survivor claimeth the
land from the first feoffor, and not by his companion. The surviving feoffee may plead a feoffment to himself without any mention of
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his joint feoffee. Co. Litt. 185 a. Hence the maxim jius aearescendi prcefertur onerius.
It is, however, true, that each joint-tenant hath but a right to a
moiety to enfeoff, give or demise. Although, as we have seen, the
surviving joint-tenant may plead the original feoffment to have been
made to him alone, yet if two joint-tenants make a feoffment, and
one die, the feoffee cannot plead it as the feoffment of the survivor,
because each of them gave but his part. If two joint-tenants be of
certain lands, and the one of them by deed indented, bargaineth
and selleth the lands, and the other joint-tenant dieth, and then the
deed is enrolled, there shall pass nothing but the moiety which the
bargainor had at the time of the bargain. Co. Litt. 186 a. If one
joint-tenant make a deed of the whole, doubtless as against his companion, and his heirs or assigns, nothing passes but his share; yet
there is no reason why as against himself it should not operate as
an estoppel, if he subsequently acquires by descent or otherwise
the share of his companion. The conveyance operates as a severance and puts an end to the joint-tenancy. It has accordingly
been decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, that though
a conveyance by one joint-tenant or tenant in common of a part of
the land described by metes and bounds is ineffectual against his
co-tenant, it avails against the grantor by estoppel. Varnum vs.
Abbot, 12 Mass. 474.
It might, perhaps, be a question whether a power by the jointtenants would not be confined to their respective interests which
they had at the time of the power. But when they expressly stipulate that the power shall include a future interest, it is in fact
reduced to the question whether when a man creates a power to sell
an estate to which he had at the time no title, it can be effectual to
pass a title which he subsequently acquires? Or whether a man
may by express words give a power to sell land to be thereafter
acquired by him? There seems no reason to doubt the soundness
of an affirmative answer to both these propositions.
In @ladwin vs. Scot, Barnes, 53, where a joint bond having
been given and a warrant of attorney to enter judgment against
one, though executed by the two, the plaintiff had leave upon the-
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common affidavit to enter judgment against the survivor. Raw vs.
Alderson, 7 Taunt. 453, which appears to be the same case, received
a different determination; there, however, the words of the power
were peculiar, as they were also, in aee vs. Lane, 15 East, 592, and
.Harrisvs. Wade, 1 Chitty, 822. The case of Clerk vs. Laurie, 1
Hurlstone & Norman Exch. Rep. 452,1 is a case in which this point
might have been made, and would have decided the controversy, it
being a case of receipt by an attorney constituted by two trustees
after the death of one of them, but the question was not raised by
court or counsel.
I have considered the question thus far as though the trustees
were joint-tenants vested with both the legal and equitable estate.
It is material to observe that there are powers of sale in the deed
of trust which operate on the beneficial interest. This power is
vested in the trustees "or the survivors or survivor of them, or the
heirs of such survivor, their or his assigns or other the trustees or
trustee for the time being," and express power is subsequently
given "to the trustees or trustee for the time being" to delegate to
an attorney all their powers. As therefore the delegation by the
trustees was joint and several, there seems no more reason to doubt
that the attorney was invested with the full powers of the survivor,
so as to pass the beneficial estate, than that he continued notwithstanding the death of one of the trustees the attorney of the survivors so as to be able to convey the legal estate. When we look
at the whole scope of the deed of settlement, it appears evident that
it was the intention of the parties that the attorney thus to be constituted for the sale and management of estates situated at a great
distance from the residence of the trustees, should continue the
attorney of the trustees for the time being, notwithstanding the
death of one or more of them; and there is no principle or rule of
law to prevent that intention from being carried into effect.
Judgment for plaintiff for $1,500.
This case, decided in the Court of Exchequer, was removed by appeal to the
,Exchequer Chamber, (See 2 Hurlstone & Norman's Exch. Reps. 199,) where it was
+Jeld that thare had not been any revocation of the authority given to the attorney.

RAYMOND vs. MIDDLETON.

In the Sutpreme Court of Pennsylvania.
RAYMOND VS. MIDDLETON & CO.-RAYMOND vs. G. W. 3IDD. ETON.
1. Where an instrument was drawn without containing in its body the usual words

of negotiability, but on the face of the note was the phrase "payable and negotiable at the Kensington Bank," it is not a negotiable note unless it is discounted
at the bank where made payable.
2. The contract of endorsement considered.

Error to Nisi Prius, Philadelphia.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-So commonly are the terms "or order," "or bearer,"
employed in commercial instruments, that we are apt to suppose
them essential to negotiability. It is otherwise. Words are but
the signs; thought is chiefly valuable; and when, for a sufficient
consideration, the minds of the parties have concurred in an agreement, that is a contract, and it must be executed as they intended,
unless forbidden by law. "Order" or "bearer" are convenient
and expressive, but clearly not the only words which will communicate the quality of negotiability. "Some equivalent words should
be used." Story on Bills, sect. 60. "Words in a bill, from -which
it can be inferred that the person making it, or any other party to
it, intended it to be negotiable, will give it a transferable quality
against that person." United States vs. White, 2 Hill, 59. The
concession, therefore, may be made, that if the makers of this note,
having omitted the usual words to express negotiability, had said,
"this note is and shall be negotiable," it would have been negotiable. But in other respects the instrument is peculiar. Created
here, it is foreign in form and appearance. The terms "or order,'
are not only omitted, but unusual words inserted in singular collocation. It is not negotiable; nor negotiable and payable, so as to
enable us to receive the first term in its general sense, and to limit
the latter to the place it mentions ; but the language is "1payable
and negotiable," thus inverting the natural order, and presenting
the idea of payment first and transfer last, and compelling us to
read it payable at, and negotiable at the Kensington Bank. Does
it mean negotiable there, to the exclusion of every other place ? Or
PORTER,
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does it mean payable there, but negotiable generally? When the
quality of negotiability has once been impressed on a note to any
extent, shall it remain there during the whole life of the instrument ?
For the solution of these questions we must go elsewhere than
in Pennsylvania. Our own books give us no help, for they contain
no such case.
Jiandevillc vs. Union Bank of Georgetown, 9 Cranch 9, affords
but little assistance, for there the note contained the words "or
order," and ended thus, "1negotiable at the Union Bank of Georgetown; payable at the Bank of Potomac." In accordance with the
arrangement it expressed, the note was actually discounted by the
former bank, and afterwards sued upon; and Chief Justice Marshall
well held that, under such circumstances, "it would be a fraud on
the bank to set up off-sets against this note, in consequence of any
transactions between the parties." We must go to those States
where the statute of 3d and 4th Anne has not been adopted, and
where, for their own protection, the charters of banks embody
special clauses, cutting off defences against notes which contain the
prescribed phraseology. The leading cases are Staff vs. Anderson,
1 A. K. Marshall, 540; Bell vs. torehead, 3 A. K. Marshall,
158; etones vs. Wood, 3 A. K. Marshall, 162. A critical examination of these cases will justify three conclusions: 1. Although the
object of the statute is not to restrict the negotiability of the instrument, but to enlarge it, this is done only for the special purpose of
enabling the bank which discounts the note, to do it with immunity
from the consequences of any taint which attached to its origin.
2. Once elevated to the grade of a negotiable paper by the act of
the bank, the note never, during its life, loses that rank. It would
be unjust if it did, for the bank ought to be allowed to part with
the obligation as it received it. When, therefore, in Bell vs. Morehead, the original holder had taken the note up, and in no sense
deduced title from the bank, he held it as a foreign bill, discharged
of all equities originating at its creation. 3. A note drawn in this
form does not become negotiable unless actually discounted by the
bank designated in the instrument. An offer for discount at that
bank is a condition precedent to all negotiability. Its negotiable
life commences when the bank becomes its owner. If rejected there,
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it sinks to the level of a common chose in action. Our sister States,
Indiana and Missouri, rejoice in similar statutes and interpretations.
Indiana Statutes, 1831, page 405 ; Tucker vs. Tipton, 4 Blackford,
529; Revised Code of Missouri, 1885, page 104; Beatty vs. Anderson, 5 Missouri Rep. 447.
A fact, if not a principle, has been developed by this research.
By no judicial decision has paper of this character been held negotiable, unless actually discounted at the designated place. The
present note was not discounted there or elsewhere. The contingency contemplated by the parties to the contract, which, according
to the Kentucky decisions, was to evoke its vital powers, did not
happen. We are then to lay aside the decisions, and look at the
note only. It is a lawful instrument. Its terms are clear. The
parties meant what they wrote, and fell into no ambiguity. They
made it in their own way, and made it with their eyes open. They
agreed that it should be negotiable at one place only. It is to be
payable and negotiable at the same place. Throwing overboard
the superfluous term "payable," as not necessary to its validity or
assignability, we have a commercial instrument which first omits
the ordinary words to express negotiability, and then sets out on its
face an equivalent term, and finally restrains the effect of that term
to one place. The designation of that place is, on a well known
legal maxim, the exclusion of every other place. A contract to go
' o the Kensington Bank, is a precise and definite contract. The
mind grasps it easily and naturally. It is as readily understood as
in a marine policy, the designation of the termination of the voyage.
Why it was necessary to go to that particular bank, we need not
inquire; the parties so wrote it, and that is enough. The same
question might arise over the term "payable." In its relation to the
bank, that term is all important; the holder demanded, and must
have demanded, payment on that spot, and no other. The duty of
payment connected itself inseparably with that place. There is no
reason for a different construction of the other term, which stands
in such close juxtaposition. The moving cause for making it an
essential element of the contract, that payment should be demanded
at one place, may have been no stronger than for providing that it
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should be negotiated at a particular place. The makers may have
had a special credit there, or have desired to avoid the injury of
indiscriminate offers of sale to other traffickers in such commodities.
Be the cause what it may, one place only, out of all other places,
was selected and written down. We cannot strike out this clause,
nor clothe it with an opposite meaning. This would be to create a
contract, not interpret it. When commercial paper has been made
negotiable, the law guards it with a fostering hand, but it makes no
effort to render negotiable that which the parties have failed to
make so. If the contract had been complied with by procuring a
discount at the Kensington Bank, it is unnecessury to decide on
the effect of that act. The question propounded on the record is
sufficiently answered by holding that the plaintiffs in the first suit
could not, in their own names, sue the makers.
The action against the endorser requires further discussion. To
a certain extent, a contract.of endorsement depends on the terms of
the original obligation. In the figurative language of the court, in
Patterson vs. Poindexter, 6 W. & S. 227, it "is a parasite, which,
like the chameleon, takes the hue of the thing with which it is connected." Writing the name of the obligee on the back of a bond is
nothing. Even the endorsement of a certificate of deposit, payable
to order, will not charge the endorser. Pattersonvs. Poindexter. The
endorsement of a negotiable note, however, is both a qualified guaranty of payment, and a transfer of title. The liability incurred by
the endorsement of a note not negotiable, has been the subject of
much discussion. In South Carolina, the plain and simple course
has been taken of pronouncing unqualifiedly against the liability of
such an endorser, in any event.
Winson vs. Mullen, 3 M'Cord,
236 ; Benton vs. Gibson, 1 Hill, 56; Pratt vs. ThVomas, 2 Hill,
654. In other States the question has been involved in perplexity.
When it came up for full discussion in Pennsylvania, in Leidy vs.
Tammany, 9 Watts, 353, Judge Kennedy, following to some extent
the lead of the Banko vs. Barriere,1 Yates, 360, held that such an
endorsement might he treated as the drawing of a new bill, and in
this he is sustained by Plinley vs. Westley, 2 Bingham's New
Cases, 249, and Gwinnell vs. Herbert, 5 Adolph. & Ellis, 436. If
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the learned judge had not said that such an endorsement was the
making of a new note, he would have avoided some confusion, for
the responsibilities of the maker of a note and the drawer of a bill
are very dissimilar, and such an endorser can stand in but one category or the other. Burmester vs. Hogart, 11 Mees. & Wels. 97.
In Jordan vs. Hurst, 2 Jones, 269, the liability of such an endorser
was assumed, and he was held not discharged by the want of timely
notice of a demand on the maker. In these cases, as well as Patterson vs. Todd, 6 Harris, 434, the notes, when endorsed, were
overdue; and the same remark may be made of Brenizer vs. WMghtman, 7 W. & S. 264, for there the instrument was a due-bill, having
no time to run, and, therefore, payable on the day it was written,
but not endorsed until afterwards. This consideration is important.
According to the theory, the endorser becomes the drawer of the
new bill, and the maker is converted into an acceptor. If this can
be done before the maturity of the note, we thus have two totally
different obligations in the same terms, running together to maturity on the same paper. This would be an anomaly. When the
holder endorses a note not due, there is no necessity for a new contract or a change of terms; for the note is in the vigor of its life,
and the enjoyment of an unsullied reputation. After dishonor, the
purchaser has reason to insist on a new contract; beforehand, such
a contract would be as useless in fact, as absurd in theory. That
our previous decisions have sustained a new contract only on matured
paper, is, therefore, not an adventitious circumstance, but a distinction deeply imbedded in sound reason, and demanded .by the
exigency of the case.
There is another feature. In all our cases an endorser has been
held liable as a new drawer only when sued by his immediate
endorsee. They might, therefore, well have been placed on the
ground most sensibly taken in Tennessee, in Wh iteman vs. Chzildress, 6 Humphrey, 303, that the liability was not upon the
endorsement, but upon the express agreement of the parties, of
which the signature was some evidence. Birkleacek vs. Wilkins,
22 Penna. State Rep. 26, went substantially on this ground, for
there the endorser was discharged because "by the very express

